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NSA review completed



Thirteenth Report

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS**

**(This report covers the week from
11 May through 17 May 1973)**

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense*

DIA Review Completed.

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Thirteenth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*

(This report covers the week from
11 May through 17 May 1973)

The Key Points

- The first combat troops in two months--some 1,000 of them--were detected starting south from North Vietnam during the week. The total number of North Vietnamese personnel infiltrating south since 27 January now stands at 45,000, some 20,000 of whom started their journeys south after the ceasefire.
- All the new combat infiltrators are headed for the northern MR 1 area, where good weather will prevail throughout the summer.
- As they normally do at this time of year, the North Vietnamese now are closing down the personnel infiltration system for the lower three-quarters of South Vietnam. They did the same thing in 1972 as the rainy season began in this area, even though their 1972 offensive was still at its height.
- A substantial volume of North Vietnamese logistic activity continued during the week along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. Heavy NVA logistic activity was observed in northern South Vietnam and in the North Vietnamese Panhandle.

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The Details

NOTE: This is the thirteenth in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.

A. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel

1. Two regular infiltration groups with a total of 1,000 combat troops were detected entering the pipeline in North Vietnam during the past week. This is the first detection of combat infiltration groups starting south from North Vietnam since 11 March. These new combat forces are all headed for northern MR 1 where good weather will prevail throughout the summer. In contrast, there is good evidence that the infiltration of combat troops to the lower three-quarters of South Vietnam is being terminated for the rainy season. This would follow the pattern observed during previous rainy seasons, when the movement of southbound infiltrators to these areas was either stopped or sharply curtailed. Aside from the combat groups, six special-purpose groups were observed departing North Vietnam during the past week, while eight other groups of civilian and military specialists were detected farther south in the Laotian Panhandle.

2. As a result of these detections, the number of North Vietnamese personnel who have entered the pipeline since 27 January is now some 20,000. Since the ceasefire, a total of about 45,000 personnel have infiltrated to the south, including some 25,000 who were in the pipeline on 27 January. With the detections noted during the past week, we

now estimate that there are several thousand infiltrators currently in the system who have not yet reached their destination. (Annex II, [redacted] contains a more detailed discussion of the information on infiltration which was received during the past week.)

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B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies Toward and Into South Vietnam and Laos

3. Evidence received during the reporting period generally showed very heavy levels of logistic activity in the northern South Vietnam/Laos border area and in the tri-border region of the southern Laos Panhandle. In both of these areas, there were detections of heavy NVA vehicle activity, and large quantities of supplies were observed either on the move or in storage. Traffic observed on the central corridor of the Laos Panhandle appeared to be somewhat below the level of the preceding week. Heavy NVA supply movements through the DMZ were also noted, and substantial shipments of ammunition were detected moving in the Vinh area of North Vietnam.


4. The following instances of Communist logistic activity inside South Vietnam were reported during the period. Activity observed in South Vietnam probably reflects supplies which have recently entered the country. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers which appear below.)

a) [redacted] several pieces of equipment associated with SA-2 missiles were observed at a truck-park along Route 9 west of Khe Sanh. Equipment detected in this possible missile support facility included a canister trailer and 6 possible guideline missile canisters.

b) [redacted] two North Vietnamese logistic units in the DMZ area handled large numbers of cargo vehicles. [redacted]

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1,800 vehicles transited a checkpoint in the area of one unit, including more than 900 supply trucks, as well as 400 troop carriers, and 487 jeeps. During the same period, the other unit reportedly handled almost 4,000 vehicles, including almost 2,000 supply trucks, as well as 900 troop carriers and 1,000 jeeps. (ANNEX III, [redacted] contains more details on this item).

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- c) [redacted] an NVA logistic unit operating in western GVN MR 1 transferred about 1,800 tons of cargo, largely munitions, between two storage facilities under its jurisdiction. Another 53 tons of cargo were received on 19 trucks from a nearby logistic entity on the same day. [redacted] the unit reportedly had over 2,600 tons of ordnance in storage.

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- d) [redacted] 41 cargo vehicles were detected on Route 548 north of the A Shau Valley (12 southbound, 2 northbound, 27 parked).

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- e) [redacted] 75 cargo trucks were parked along Route 608 north of Khe Sanh.

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- f) [redacted] 83 cargo trucks were operating along Route 9 in northern Quang Tri Province between Dong Ha and the Laos/South Vietnam border.

- g) [redacted] 69 southbound vehicles were detected moving on Route 1033 in the western DMZ.

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5. During the reporting period the following indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in northern Laos, southern Laos, and northeastern Cambodia were noted. Historical precedent would suggest that much of the activity in southern Laos

and northeastern Cambodia probably involved supplies destined for South Vietnam.

- a) The table below lists observed NVA vehicle activity on selected routes in the Laos Panhandle during the reporting period.*

<u>Route 99</u>	<u>Route 9211</u>	<u>Route 958</u>
139 (112-N, 3-S)	161 (28-N, 94-S)	19 (3-N, 12-S)
43 (21-N, 22-S)	58 (4-N, 40-S)	18 (1-N, 10-S)
83 (6-N, 29-S)	167 (7-N, 122-S)	11 (0-N, 0-S)
29 (1-N, 18-S)	41 (11-N, 12-S)	61 (0-N, 10-S)
33 (6-N, 19-S)	NC**	40 (1-N, 31-S)
45 (21-N, 12-S)	29 (25-N, 2-S)	34 (8-N, 2-S)
48 (31-N, 8-S)	30 (5-N, 20-S)	NC**

* The first number in each entry is the total number of vehicles. Of these totals, the number of trucks moving north (N) or south (S) are noted in the parentheses after each total. The remainder of the vehicles detected were parked along the roadway, moving neither north nor south at the time of observation.

** No coverage.

- b) Other significant vehicle activity included:

- 1) 36 cargo trucks were detected on Route 966 east of Chavane. 17 of these trucks were headed eastward toward the Laos/South Vietnam border.

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2) [] 32 loaded cargo trucks were observed traveling eastward toward GVN MR 2 on Route 96/110 in the tri-border area of Laos.

c) [] 40 trucks were active in the operational area of an NVA unit in the tri-border area of Laos. During the period [] the same unit handled nearly 1,200 tons of cargo and had almost 3,800 tons in storage. The unit involved is primarily responsible for the movement of cargo from the southern Laos Panhandle into GVN MR 2 and Cambodia.

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d) [] five T54/55 medium tanks were observed partially concealed along a major route about 10 miles west of Nong Pet in northern Laos. Two other tanks of undetermined type were also observed east of the above location. The date these tanks entered northern Laos could not be determined. Although other types of tanks have previously been observed in North Laos, this is the first time T54/55s have been detected in this area.

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e) [] an NVA logistic unit in the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam had plans to dispatch 20 vehicles daily for a 17-day period [] The destination of the trucks and the cargo being carried by the vehicles could not be determined.

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f) [] a major NVA logistic entity operating in the GVN MR 1/Laos border area was handling 300-400 cargo vehicles each day.

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g) [] the NVA unit responsible for moving supplies from the tri-border area into the central highlands of South Vietnam received 132 cargo vehicles from another unit operating further north in the Laos Panhandle.

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h) [] 76 southbound and 59 northbound vehicles were observed traveling through the Ban Karai Pass on Route 912.

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i) [] some 30 tons of weapons and ammunition were being shipped south daily on the Mekong River from Stung Treng in Cambodia to a supply point a few miles north of Kratie. The North Vietnamese employed 10 motorboats to transport these munitions.

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6. There is additional evidence of the continuing movement within North Vietnam of military and other supplies probably destined for South Vietnam and southern Laos.

a) [] the major NVA logistic command operating in the Vinh area received eight railcar loads of ammunition. Nearly 200 tons of supplies, including 122-mm rockets, 60-mm mortar, and 57-mm antiaircraft ammunition, were included in the deliveries. The ammunition was moved to a storage facility which handles cargo for both South Vietnam and northern Laos.

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C. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces in South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

7. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by

the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January and for the last week (11-17 May) are shown below:

<u>Military Region</u>	<u>Total Since Ceasefire Level of Action</u>		<u>Last Week (11-17 May) Level of Action</u>	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	910	3,021	26	92
MR 2	216	1,565	6	74
MR 3	337	2,106	9	91
MR 4	550	5,027	33	319
Totals	2,013	11,719	74(84) <u>1/</u>	576(598) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

8. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the chart on the following page, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission (GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.

9. The following is a chronological listing of only the most significant "major" communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week.

MILITARY REGION 1


- a) On 12 and 14 May, 9 miles northeast of Quang Ngai City, enemy forces conducted several ground attacks.




CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)


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
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MAR



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- b) On 17 May, 8 miles west of Hue, friendly forces received an enemy attack-by-fire of 440 rounds.

MILITARY REGION 2

- a) On 15 May, 2 miles northeast of Kontum City, a friendly A-1H aircraft was shot down by enemy ground fire.
- b) On 16 May, 6 miles northwest of Kontum City, friendly forces received an attack-by-fire of 200 mortar rounds.
- c) On 16 May, 8 miles south of Bong Son, enemy forces conducted a ground attack.

MILITARY REGION 3

- a) Nothing of significance to report.

MILITARY REGION 4

- a) On 16 May, 1 mile southwest of Vi Thanh, a friendly helicopter was shot down by enemy ground fire.

D. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces in Laos During the Week From 11 Through 17 May

10. For the second consecutive week, there have been no reports of serious Communist-initiated incidents in Laos. As the scale of fighting continues to diminish, the frequency of front line meetings between members of opposing forces appears to be increasing. Although some of these meetings have been arranged by one side or the other for the purpose of disseminating propaganda or gaining possibly useful tactical information, many of the contacts have been spontaneous and have resulted simply in the exchanging of pleasantries and pledges of goodwill, and gifts of rice, cigarettes and clothing items.

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ANNEX II

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese
Personnel to the South

1. For the first time in more than two months, two regular combat infiltration groups with nearly 1,000 personnel were detected entering the pipeline in North Vietnam. These two groups--4008 and 4009--are en route to MR Tri-Thien-Hue in northern MR 1. The detection of these groups permits five others which probably have departed since late February to be gap-filled at a strength of 500 each. These new combat replacements, plus the continuing infiltration of civil and military specialists, raise our estimate of regular infiltration starts since 27 January 1973 to some 20,000.

2. Fourteen special-purpose groups with nearly three hundred specialists were also reported during the week. Six of these groups were noted departing Binh Tram 18 at Vinh on 12 and 13 May. With the exception of one group, all of these special-purpose groups were destined for the COSVN area.

3. In contrast, a number of recent messages from the North Vietnamese communications-liaison system in the southern part of the Laotian Panhandle and northeastern Cambodia indicate that the infiltration of regular combat troops to the B-3 Front and the COSVN area will be terminated for the rainy season. This would follow the pattern observed during previous rainy seasons, when the movement of southbound infiltrators to these areas was either stopped or sharply curtailed. At least four communications-liaison battalions recently have been told by higher headquarters that they were not to receive any more southbound personnel and were ordered to dispatch any infiltrators who currently remain in their areas of operation. Moreover, Group 470--which oversees infiltration and logistics movements in the extreme southern part of the

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Panhandle and northeastern Cambodia--was recently told by the headquarters of MR. 559 that, after Group 2008 had "cleared the system," no new infiltration groups would be sent south.

4. The following table lists those infiltration groups which were reported for the first time during the past week.

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Infiltration Groups Initially Reported
During the Past Week

<u>Group</u> <u>Designator</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date of</u> <u>Detection</u>
4008	520	North Vietnam	12 May
4009	470	North Vietnam	13 May
A247	35	North Vietnam	12 May
A288	22	South Laos	7 May
A292	24	South Laos	7 May
A293	25	South Laos	7 May
A294	23	South Laos	7 May
QL203	3	South Laos	11 May
QL205	4	North Vietnam	13 May
QL207	15	North Vietnam	13 May
QL208	14	North Vietnam	13 May
QL209	14	North Vietnam	13 May
QL465	7	North Vietnam	13 May
Y284	Unk	South Laos	5 May
Y288	44	South Laos	8 May
Y297	Unk	South Laos	5 May

ANNEX III

The information contained in paragraph 4 (b) was obtained in two 10 May intercepts of communications from an unidentified NVA rear services unit located in the Binh Tram 12 area of operation (the eastern portion of the DMZ). The rear services unit is believed to be a vehicle checkpoint composed of teams which monitor and control traffic on roads in the Binh Tram 12 area. The precise locations of the teams are not known, so the possibility of double counting between the two reports exists. Although the checkpoint has reported vehicles heading north and south in the past, this report only referred to the number of vehicles "handled," thus preventing an assessment of the direction of traffic flow. The level of traffic reported by the checkpoint (about 400 trucks per day and 400 other vehicles per day) is unsubstantiated by any other source. Photographs and fragmentary communications from other rear service elements indicate that an average of about 200-300 short tons per day (50-75 vehicles per day) may have been entering Quang Tri from North Vietnam during May. Although this is admittedly a very soft estimate, it does cast some doubt on the vehicle checkpoint reporting contained in these two intercepted messages.

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